Using a proprietary database of institutional trades we find direct evidence that institutions churn stocks, increase the average commission per share they pay, and pay unusually high commissions on some trades in order to send abnormally high commissions to lead underwriters of upcoming profitable IPOs. We show that these excess commission payments are a particularly effective way for transient investors to receive lucrative IPO allocations, and that the presence of abnormal commission payments is related to underwriter characteristics -including the concentration of the underwriter's client base. Our results suggest that the underwriter's concern for their long-term client relationships disciplines the payment-for-IPO practice. We estimate total market-wide abnormal commission payments are $2.2 million per IPO for the most profitable issues, and that an additional $1 excess commission payment to the lead underwriter results in $2.76 in investor profits from allocated shares.
I. Introduction
Institutional investors are justifiably interested in receiving initial public offering (IPO) allocations given the historical profitability of these positions. The 1,555 firms that went public from 1999 to 2005 left more than $82 billion on the table.
1 Since bookrunners (i.e. lead underwriters) have significant discretion in allocating shares when bookbuilding is used, much of the lobbying by institutional investors should be directed toward the lead underwriter. 2 Existing academic theories seeking to explain the allocation decisions of underwriters suggest that underwriters receive benefits (tangible or intangible) in return for allocating shares to certain investors. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that IPO allocations encourage privately-informed investors to reveal their information to the lead underwriter. While this intangible benefit may be a factor in allocation decisions, it is also possible that underwriters allocate IPO shares to investors who provide them with more tangible benefits. According to the agency view advocated by Ritter (2002, 2004 ), investors will engage in rent-seeking behavior, such as sending trading commissions to the underwriter's brokerage arm, to increase their probability of being allocated profitable IPO shares.
Recent survey evidence by Jenkinson and Jones (2009) Stephens use an index, ranking investors by commissions paid over the previous eighteen months, to decide who would receive profitable IPO allocations. 3 This evidence is consistent with empirical findings by Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2008) who suggest that 1 Money left on the table is defined as the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price times the number of shares offered as in Loughran and Ritter (2002) . We obtain information for the total dollar value of money left on the table from Jay Ritter's website: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Moneybyyear.pdf. 2 Boehmer, Boehmer, and Fishe (2006) find the lead underwriter is responsible for allocating approximately 75% of the total number of shares offered. 3 According to the SEC, the allocation of IPO shares based on past or expected future commission business is legal. However, lead underwriters are restricted from sharing in any client profits that may result from underpricing. See Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent sent to the NASD (no. CAF030001).
institutions concentrate their trading with particular brokerage firms, and in return, receive preferential treatment with regard to brokerage services.
The purpose of this study is to directly investigate the relationship between trading commissions and IPO allocations. We are aware of only two other studies that attempt to investigate this relationship. Using semi-annual mutual fund reports, Reuter (2006) in the period immediately preceding the IPO in order to send commissions to the lead underwriter. 4 The stable and transient investor views of IPO allocation contracting are paradoxical, since two distinct investor groups receive preference in IPO allocations. 5 In addition, both studies are constrained by both IPO allocation and commission data limitations. We reconcile Reuter's stable investor view and NRZ's transient investor evidence in a single stylized model, and provide new and more detailed evidence of commission payments for IPO allocations using a proprietary database of institutional trades.
Our paper makes several distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a theoretical model where both stable and transient investors coexist. Second, we are the first to provide direct evidence of excess lead underwriter commission revenues in the period immediately preceding the most profitable IPOs. Third, we are the first study to investigate trading strategies (e.g. stock churning or paying unusually high commissions on some trades) that institutions might use to increase the commissions they pay to lead underwriters. Fourth, we find that inflated commission payments depend on lead-underwriter characteristics, such as the concentration of its client base. Finally, we use our unique dataset to show that institutions are successful in using commissions to capture IPO profits.
4 NRZ (2007) do not have information on trading commissions or the brokerage firm involved in each trade, thus inference concerning the behavior of transient investors is circumstantial. 5 For clarity, we refer to stable and transient investor groups using different methods to pay for IPO allocation. In our paper these investor groups refer to two distinct payment contracts, a stable long-term commission payment and a transient spot payment at the time of IPO issuance. We find that stable clients tend to use the long-term commission payment and transient clients tend to use the spot contract, but the contracts are not mutually exclusive and both types of investors could use both methods of payment to a greater or lesser extent.
We begin our empirical investigation by dividing all IPOs into quartiles based on the amount of money left on the table. Using an event study methodology, we find significant increases in lead underwriter commission revenue for the two most profitable IPO quartiles.
These excess commissions are concentrated in the ten-day period immediately preceding the IPO offer date. Post-issue commission payments in return for IPO allocations appear to be concentrated with one subsequently prosecuted brokerage firm rather than a general phenomenon. 6 Our results are consistent with strategic decisions by transient investors to use commission dollars as a means of obtaining profitable IPO allocations. We confirm that these findings are robust to a variety of alternate specifications and cannot be attributed to marketwide changes in trading volume or the clustering of IPO issuance.
The economic significance of our finding is also important. In the next section, we present the hypotheses that result from our theoretical model.
Section III presents our data and Section IV presents the main empirical results of our investigation. Section V examines some trading strategies that institutions might employ to increase commission payments. Section VI examines the determinants of abnormal commissions, including client concentration and IPO profitability. Section VII examines the relation between abnormal commissions and IPO allocations more directly using data on post-IPO sales. Section VIII concludes.
II. Investors, Underwriters, and commissions payments prior to an IPO Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and others develop models using information asymmetry to explain the IPO bookbuilding process. While information revelation may be a determinant in underwriters' allocation decisions, it is also probable that quid pro quo commission arrangements are of principle importance in the allocation process (Jenkinson and Jones (2009 ), Loughran and Ritter (2002 ).
Prior literature suggests that there are stable institutional clients who pay a regular stream of commission dollars to the underwriter. As in Reuter (2006) , Binay, Gatchev, and Pirinsky (2007) , and Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel and Wiener (2008) Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are unique to our paper; they are not contained in either Reuter (2006 ) or NRZ (2007 . In the next section, we describe the data used to empirically test these hypotheses.
III. Data and methodology

III.A. Trading data
We obtain institutional trading data from ANcerno Ltd. Lipson and Puckett (2007) , and Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2008 appear large enough to entice some institutions to attempt to purchase IPO allocations with excess commission payments. We next investigate whether the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.
IV. Main Results
IV.A. Event Study
We first use an event study to examine the existence and timing of abnormal lead underwriter commission revenues. IPOs during the bubble period and $37,150 (t-statistic=2.48) in the non-bubble period.
Controlling for the increase in overall commissions paid over our sample period, we find that in both bubble and non-bubble periods the abnormal lead underwriter commissions are about 5% more than the benchmark level. 16 For quartile 3 IPOs, there are some differences between the time periods. Event period commissions for quartile 3 are not significantly different than benchmark levels during the bubble period, but during the non-bubble period abnormal commissions are $32,712 (t-statistic=2.55) per day. Our results suggest that abnormal commission payments exist in both the bubble and non-bubble periods, and that in each case
institutions pay approximately 5% more immediately prior to the offer date.
The economic value of these inflated commissions is significant. As noted previously, our estimates suggest that ten-day lead underwriter excess commission revenue per IPO is $181,500 for IPOs in quartile 4 and $133,420 for IPOs in quartile 3. However, our data represents only 7.97 percent of CRSP daily share volume. If we gross up our average abnormal commission per IPO (by 1/0.0797), we estimate total market-wide abnormal commissions of $2,277,000 ($1,674,000) per IPO for lead underwriters of quartile 4 (quartile 3) IPOs. With 577 IPOs in quartiles 3 and 4 estimated aggregate abnormal commissions received by lead underwriters is $1.14 billion.
abnormal commission payments in the [+1, +5] period after the IPO offer date for both quartile 3 and quartile 4 IPOs during the bubble period. By extrapolating our volume data to CRSP total volume levels, we estimate over $46.7 million in excess commissions were received by CSFB in this period. Our estimates are consistent with the magnitude of SEC litigation release 17327 claiming $70 million in improper gains that CSFB was ordered to disgorge. 15 In robustness tests we define the bubble period subsample as 1999 to 2000 and find results similar to those reported in Table 2 .
The economic magnitude of this revenue is still small relative to the $58 billion left on the table by these IPOs. It is puzzling why even higher abnormal commissions are not observed given the large profits available. Profit maximizing underwriters would be better served by raising the offer price of the IPO and capturing 7% of any additional proceeds in the form of underwriting fees (Chen and Ritter (2000) ). However, this argument ignores externalities surrounding underpricing and allocation decisions including extracting valuable information from informed investors (Benveniste and Spindt (1989) ), managing litigation risks (Tinic (1988) , Lowry and Shu (2002) ) and the long term nature of broker-client contracts (Goldstein et al. (2008) ).
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It is notable that we do not observe excess commissions for quartile 2 IPOs, which are profitable ex post. Consistent with our model, these results suggest that expected profits must be large to engender transient investors to offer commission payments to obtain allocations.
Only when IPO profits are extremely large can transient investors justify a large enough extra payment to induce lead underwriters to allocate shares away from their stable clients.
IV.B. Robustness tests
Event study results in Table 2 indicate that for the most profitable IPOs, lead underwriters receive increased commission revenues during the ten-day period immediately preceding the offer date. However, prior research reports that IPO activity is both clustered in calendar time and is related to aggregate market activity (Lowry (2003) ). We investigate the potential effects of these trends in two robustness tests.
IV.B.1. Calendar-time regressions
If IPO events are clustered in calendar time, our event study may suffer from correlated errors and a tendency to over-reject the null. Although many prior studies document IPO clustering in hot markets (e.g. Ritter and Welch (2002)), we reiterate that our analysis investigates lead underwriter commission revenues only, thus mitigating the clustering problem. We present the following illustration to clarify this issue:
IPOs issued in April 1999
Goldman Sachs IPOs
Merrill Lynch IPOs Credit Suisse IPOs
The above 
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is the commission revenue received on day t by lead underwriter j. The independent variable of interest, Money, is the aggregate amount of money left on the table by underwriter j, summed over days t+1 through t+5 (or t+1 through t+10). We include four lags of the Commission variable to control for daily autocorrelation in the level of underwriter commissions (see NRZ (2007)) and the absolute value of the CRSP equally-weighted return (|Mktret t |) since institutional volume is higher during large market movements (Dennis and Strickland (2002) ). Finally, we include month fixed effects (Month)
to control for any time-series changes in the frequency of trading in our data. We adjust all tstatistics using Newey-West standard errors. 
IV.B.2. Difference-of-differences Test
Lowry and Schwert (2002) suggest that IPO activity is related to lagged market activity. If IPO issuance clusters during periods of high market volumes then aggregate commission payments to all brokerage firms, and not just the lead underwriter, would increase just prior to hot IPO offer dates. We address this concern using a difference-ofdifferences test to directly compare event-period commission revenues received by lead underwriters to the commissions received by other brokerage firms in the database.
For each IPO, we construct a comparative sample of non-lead underwriting brokers by requiring that a broker cannot act as a lead underwriter for any IPO during the [-10, +10] day period surrounding a sample IPO's offer date. By comparing the time-series of commission revenues for lead underwriters to that of non-lead brokers, we control for external market conditions affecting all brokers.
For each IPO, we calculate the average daily event-period commission revenue [-10, - 1] minus the average daily non-event commission revenue from [-60, -21] and [21, 60] , and divide this difference by the average daily non-event period commission revenue. As such, our measure is the percentage change in commission revenue a brokerage firm experiences in the ten-day period immediately preceding the IPO offer date. This normalization controls for cross-sectional differences across brokers in each group, and is similar to the methodology employed by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) . We construct this measure for three groups: the lead underwriter, a matched-pair control sample (the lead underwriter is matched with one non-lead brokerage firm that is closest in average daily non-event commission revenue), and a control portfolio of all non-lead brokerage firms. For brevity we limit our tests to the [-10, -1] event period, since this is where we find a significant increase in lead underwriter commission revenue.
Our results are reported in Table 4 , and are consistent with all earlier results. For the highest two Money quartiles, we find that lead-underwriter commissions increase by 10.62%
(quartile 4) and 7.07% (quartile 3) . 18 Untabulated results demonstrate that these numbers are similar across the bubble and non-bubble sub-periods, so the magnitude of these increases is relatively consistent across time. For quartile 2 and quartile 1, lead underwriter commission revenues increase by 0.69% and decrease by -1.10% respectively. These findings are quite apparent when illustrated graphically as in Figure 1 , which plots the change in daily commission revenue during the [-20, +20] period.
Comparing lead underwriter revenues to the control samples in Table 4 is particularly revealing. Non-lead brokers display little evidence of increased commission revenues around quartile 3 and quartile 4 IPOs. For the matched control sample, brokerage revenues decrease by -3.00% prior to quartile 3 IPOs, and increase by 0.13% prior to quartile 4 IPOs. Both of these changes are insignificant. For the control portfolio we find that the only significant change occurs prior to quartile 4 IPOs, where commissions increase by 3.49%.
To test for differences between the samples, we take the percentage commission change for each IPO-lead underwriter observation and subtract the percentage commission change for the appropriate control sample. For quartile 4 (quartile 3) IPOs, we find that lead 18 The results in Table 2 are aggregates of commission dollars to lead underwriters across all IPOs, while the statistics in Table 4 are constructed from ratios of each lead underwriter's event and non-event periods. The ratio of the aggregate numbers in Table 2 will be different than the average of the ratios shown in Table 4 .
underwriters experience increases in commission revenues that are 10.48% (10.04%) larger than the matched control sample and 7.13% (5.78%) larger than the control portfolio sample.
Overall, these robustness tests indicate that our primary results cannot be attributed to unusually high market-wide volume.
V. Trading Strategies
Institutions might employ a variety of trading strategies to increase the commission dollars sent to lead underwriters. These behaviors include: increasing the number of trades, increasing the average commission per share paid, paying unusually high commissions for some trades, or churning stocks with the explicit purpose of generating commissions. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and all would increase commission revenues. There is some anecdotal evidence that some institutions paid unusually high commissions per share or churned stocks (bought and sold the same stock simultaneously in order to generate commissions) in return for IPO allocations; however, we do not know whether these activities are pervasive. 19 We investigate each of these trading behaviors to determine whether they contribute to elevated lead underwriter commissions.
We repeat the event study methodology outlined in Table 2 for the following lead underwriter variables: 1) shares traded, 2) average share-weighted commission, 3) percentage of trades paying unusually high commissions (greater than ten cents per share), and 4) commission revenues from churn trades. Table 5 reports average daily statistics for all variables in the non-event period and abnormal daily levels (event period minus non-event period) in the event period.
Our first measure (shares traded) in Table 5 are only concerned with changes in this type of activity routed through the lead underwriter.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that commissions from churn trades (churn commissions)
increase by $4,520 per day (t-statistic=4.42) in the [-10, -1] period for the highest Money quartile. By comparing these results with overall changes in commission revenue reported in Table 2 , we find that churn commissions account for approximately 25 percent of the total increase in commission revenue. However, we find no evidence of significant increases in churn for any other quartile. We also examine the bubble and non-bubble periods separately and find some evidence of churning during both subperiods. Our results are consistent with circumstantial evidence presented by NRZ (2007), but also suggest that churning represents only a fraction of the pay for IPO picture.
Institutions can also increase the per-share commissions paid on trades. We use two variables in our tests: average per-share commission (commission per share, measured in cents) received by the lead underwriter, and the frequency of trades paying greater than 10 cents per share. A commission over 10 cents a share is unusually large (Goldstein et al. (2008) ) but paying a large commission is an effective way to increase underwriter commission revenues.
For the commissions per share measure, we calculate the share-weighted daily average commission for all commission-paying trades executed by the lead underwriter. In
Panel B of Table 5 allocations (see footnotes 6 and 14). However, the lack of confirming evidence in total commission revenue in Table 2 cautions against concluding that widespread ex post settling up occurred. Our subperiod analyses indicate that these increases occurred only during the excesses of the bubble period.
Collectively, our results indicate that institutions use a variety of trading strategies to increase lead underwriter commissions. The total number of shares traded, commissions from churn trades, average commission per share, and the frequency of trades paying greater than 10 cents per share are all significantly elevated in the pre-offer period for the most profitable
IPOs. In addition, the results in Tables 2, 4 , and 5 provide some evidence that institutions reallocate trades from brokerages that did not have a hot IPO to those that did.
VI. Determinants of abnormal commissions
The event study, calendar-time portfolio regression, and the difference-of-differences test results establish that, across a broad sample of lead underwriters, abnormal commission payments occur primarily in the ten days preceding the most profitable IPOs. Here we extend our analysis by investigating the determinants of pre-issue abnormal commission payments (AC) to the lead underwriter: Size, and we include each of these components separately in Equation (2). A larger Offer Size could provide greater opportunities for transient investors to obtain an allocation. However, since institutions send abnormal commission payments prior to the IPO offer date, the relevant construct in our model is ex ante (i.e. expected) profitability. Hanley (1993) provides evidence that pre-offer price adjustment is highly correlated with ex post IPO profitability.
Our measure of ex ante profitability is Price Runup, which is the offer price less the midpoint of the filing range divided by the midpoint of the filing range. We expect that Price Runup, Underpricing and Offer Size will be positively related to abnormal commissions. However, due to the high positive correlation (ρ=0.64) between Underpricing and Price Runup, we include them both separately and together in different specifications of Equation (2).
We control for several other characteristics of the IPO and lead underwriter. Scarcity attempts to measure pre-issue demand for the IPO and is calculated as the final offer size divided by the first filed offer size. We include the variable Bulge, a dummy variable equal to one if the lead underwriter is ranked in the top ten using Megginson and Weiss (1991) rankings, to control for underwriter reputation. Finally, we include year fixed effects to control for changing market conditions across the sample period. We estimate the regression using GMM to control for any potential correlation in the error structure across observations.
Panel A of 20 We lose six observations due to data requirements for the creation of the Herfindahl index. As a result, our full sample in Panel A of Table 6 drops by six to 1,150 observations, and the sample in Panel B also drops by six from 467 to 461. 21 We run empirical tests presented in Tables 2, 4 , and 5 on the unclustered control sample and all of the results continue to hold. Due to the construction of the calendar time regressions, we did not re-run Table 3 on this sample.
Bulge is now insignificant. We continue to find strong support of Hypothesis 2, in that the coefficient on Herf continues to be negative and significant in all three regression specifications.
Overall, we continue to find that higher abnormal commissions are associated with the more profitable IPOs as predicted by Hypothesis 1. As suggested by Hypothesis 2, we find direct confirmation that this effect is mitigated the more concentrated the underwriter's client base. Both results are robust to a variety of regression specifications and to a restricted sample of unclustered IPOs.
VII. Abnormal commissions and IPO allocations
Stable investors who regularly send commission dollars to the underwriter expect to receive IPO allocations as a part of their business relationship. Transient investors opportunistically send commission revenues to the lead underwriter with expectations that these revenues will result in an allocation. Although we present empirical evidence that some investors send elevated commission revenue to lead underwriters, we have not yet established whether these excess payments result in a larger allocation of profitable IPO shares.
Unfortunately, IPO allocation data are not generally available. Reuter (2006) uses mutual fund family holdings as a proxy for IPO allocations. Since we cannot identify the institutions in our sample by name, this proxy is not available to us. However, we can supplement Reuter's (2006) analysis by examining net selling in the 30 days after the IPO.
Using a methodology similar to Chemmanur and Hu (2007) , we contend that net selling is a reliable proxy for initially allocated shares, and a particularly good proxy for immediately realized profits.
We are interested in whether an institution's abnormal commissions paid to the lead underwriter are related to the size of that institution's IPO allocation and whether the relation between abnormal commissions and IPO allocation varies across investor types as predicted in Hypotheses 3 and 4. To investigate these hypotheses we first run the following regression:
We construct the dependent variable, Allocation, by tracking trading in IPO, i, by each institution, k, from the moment the IPO is listed for public trading through thirty calendar days following the IPO offer date. We calculate the net imbalance for each IPOinstitution pairing and assume that all institutions who are net sellers receive an allocation equal to the magnitude of net sales. 22 Empirically, our measure captures only allocated shares that institutions choose to flip in the month following the IPO, therefore, our measure will understate the total shares allocated when institutions hold these shares for more than thirty days. This measurement error biases against finding results in our regression specification.
We normalize our allocation estimate by the number of shares offered to control for crosssectional differences in net selling activity related to the size of the IPO. Clients with a positive buy-sell imbalance are assumed to receive no allocation, and therefore we estimate Equation (3) using a truncated regression specification. 22 It is also possible that this measure will include short-sales by these institutions. While Hanley, Lee, and Seguin (1996) suggest that short-sales are constrained immediately after an IPO, Edwards and Hanley (2008) demonstrate otherwise. Given that ANcerno clients are pension funds and money managers, it is unlikely that there is significant short-selling in the data. Even so, it is highly unlikely that any short-selling by clients would cause them to send abnormal commissions to the lead underwriter ex ante. As a result, any inclusion of shortselling in our data would bias against finding results.
Client
We construct the dummy variable Transient using Equation (4) which estimates an autocorrelation coefficient based on the past six months relationship between underwriter j and institution k:
We contend that stable clients pay regular commissions to the underwriter, so they will have relatively high month-to-month correlation in their commissions. To construct the dummy variable Transient we divide the sample into two groups based on the median autocorrelation coefficient from Equation (4). Institutions whose autocorrelation coefficient is less than the median are assigned a Transient value equal to one, and zero otherwise. (2006) and Goldstein et al. (2008) . However, if a transient institution sends commissions prior to the IPO, the number of shares they receive increases significantly. These results are in accordance with our model and our hypotheses.
We further explore these effects by separating the sample into transient and stable
investors. In columns (3) and (4) The coefficient on abnormal commissions in Table 7 and our data on IPO profitability allow us to estimate the elasticity accruing to short-term institutions that send commissions to the lead underwriter. Using these, we estimate that transient institutions receive approximately $2.76 in IPO profits from allocated shares for each $1 in abnormal commissions sent to the lead underwriter. Sending more commissions to a lead underwriter is therefore a profitable activity for both the client and the lead underwriter.
To conclude we examine the allocation of IPOs to transient and stable institutions. 
VIII. Conclusion
Recent literature suggests that quid pro quo arrangements are of principal importance in lead underwriter IPO allocation decisions. The agency view advocated by Ritter (2002, 2004) as well as survey evidence by Jenkinson and Jones (2007) support the idea that lead underwriters allocate lucrative IPO shares to clients who provide them with commission revenues. Reuter (2006) suggests that these institutional clients provide longterm streams of commission revenues, whereas Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang (2007) find circumstantial evidence consistent with investors opportunistically sending short-term commission payments to lead underwriters in the period immediately surrounding the IPO offer date.
We find significant increases in lead underwriter commission revenues during the ten-day period before the most profitable IPOs. For the most profitable IPO quartile, commission revenues increase by 10.62%, and we estimate the total market-wide abnormal commission payments to be $2.2 million per IPO for the most lucrative IPOs and $1.14 billion over the entire time period. We confirm that these findings are robust to a variety of alternate specifications and cannot be attributed to market-wide changes in trading volume or IPO clustering. Our results are consistent with strategic decisions by some institutions to use commission dollars as a means of obtaining profitable IPO allocations.
Our findings suggest that the institutions in our sample strategically employ a variety of trading strategies to increase lead underwriter commissions including churning stocks, increasing commissions per share, and paying unusually high commissions for some trades.
We estimate that commissions from churn trades account for 25 percent of the total increase in commission revenue for the most profitable IPO quartile. In addition, for this quartile the average commission paid for all trades increase from 4.95 cents per share to 5.04 cents per share, and the frequency of trades paying greater than 10 cents per share goes from 0.53% to 0.70%.
Institutions with stable long-term relationships with the underwriter expect to receive IPO allocations as part of their normal business relationship with the lead underwriter.
Transient institutions, lacking this relationship, rely more on increasing underwriter commission revenues prior to the IPO. As stable institutions lose when transient institutions receive allocations, they have incentives to monitor the lead underwriter. We find that stable institutions do receive the bulk of the IPO allocation and that the amount of abnormal commissions paid by institutions to the lead underwriter is inversely related to the concentration of the underwriter's client base. We interpret the latter finding as consistent with our assumption that institutions can discipline underwriters and this disciplinary mechanism limits the practice of paying for allocations with abnormal commissions.
Finally, our data also allows us to examine whether particular institutions are successful in using commissions to capture IPO profits. Specifically, we investigate whether increased commissions sent to the lead underwriter result in larger allocations of profitable of their IPO allocation:
Where F is the expected first day closing price less the known IPO offer price, and A is the number of shares expected to be received in the allocation process. While A is unknown ex 25 Intuitively, C could be considered the present value of all future commissions generated from the type S investors. 26 Alternatively, we could assume that if the underwriter cheats, all stable investors find out, and all of them lower the commissions sent to that underwriter by k. Our presentation assumes that one, or a subset, of type S investors discovers the underwriter's cheating behavior. Under our assumption, the composition of the underwriter's client base could affect their decision.
ante, it is determined endogenously in our model and thus can be predicted by the transient investor given the excess commissions they pay and the exogenous elements of the underwriter's problem. Transient investors will offer an extra payment when expected profits are positive:
Clearly, there is an ongoing bargaining problem between the underwriter and the transient investor over the division of potential profits. However, the bargaining problem adds complexity without adding additional insight into our main results. Therefore, we assume that the underwriter extracts all possible rents from the transient investor and thus the size of the bribe can be defined directly as a function of expected IPO underpricing:
Faced with the possibility of additional revenue from transient investors, the underwriter's choice is to allocate all IPO shares to stable investors S and receive C or to allocate A shares to transient investors T. If they are not caught by their stable investors, the underwriter will continue to receive C and also pocket c. If they are caught, the underwriter will receive c, but only kC from their stable customers.
The postulated function р(A) represents the probability that stable investors S detect cheating and punish the underwriter. Hence p(A) determines the underwriter's willingness to allocate shares to transient investors. The probability of being caught cheating is assumed to be increasing and convex in the size of the allocation, A, to type T investors. Given this assumption, the underwriter's decision on whether to cheat depends on the relative payoffs of the two strategies:
or:
If the underwriter's participation constraint in Equation (5) is met, the underwriter will allocate shares to type T investors.
A type S investor may be unhappy with their allocation and suspect the underwriter of reneging on their long-term agreement. However, since the actual demand function for IPO shares is determined in the pre-issue bookbuilding process, only the underwriter sees the true aggregate demand curve. Therefore, verification of cheating is costly and uncertain. The underwriter will be more likely to cheat and allocate IPOs to type T investors, the greater the short-term commission payment c, the lower the probability of being caught cheating p(A), and the less severe the punishment fraction (1-k).
The underwriter's problem is to maximize revenue (R) from Equation (4) [ ]
Substituting Equation (3) for c produces the first order condition:
The solution to the underwriter's problem in Equation (8) trades off the marginal benefit from sending one more share to type T investors, ) (F E , against the marginal cost,
, which is the change in the probability of detection multiplied by the cost of the punishment. 
